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## State Dept. Operations Analyzed

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A Harvard professor has told a Senate subcommittee he doubts the value of applying the Defense Department's coordinating techniques in the State Department because "foreign affairs is a complicated and disorderly business."

In an obvious comparison of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Dr. Thomas C. Schelling—who is consultant to both their departments—wrote of the Defense-planned system:

"PPBS works best for an aggressive master; and where there is no master, or where the master wants the machinery to produce his decisions without his own participation, the value of PPBS is likely to be modest and, depending on the people, may even be negative."

In the report, released yesterday, Schelling commented on the planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) that the Administration would like to see in national security departments and agencies.

Sen. Henry M. Jackson's subcommittee on national security and international operations has turned a sharp eye in the past on PPBS and Schelling's report is likely to strengthen that attitude.

Schelling wrote that even if it seemed ideal to transfer the functions of the Secretary of State, he doubted that Congress or even the Secretaries themselves wanted State to have such authority and efficiency.

Schelling's report reflects his conclusion that State was pulled out of a planned year's stay last year, after being invited to help introduce more interagency, coordination in the foreign policy-making process.

He noted that PPBS worked best in decisions that are largely budgetary, and Defense had a clearly defined budget sphere whereas the \$5.6 billion figure for State "makes a lot of sense to the Director of the Budget but has no official status and corresponds to no appropriations procedure."

Schelling raised the question of who is supposed to coordinate foreign policy, and suggested that "maybe the answer is, 'nobody.'" But if the President and the Congress wanted this responsibility fixed, he felt it would logically be in the Secretary of State's hands.

"But to put this responsibility on the Secretary of State is to give him both a means and an obligation to assume the kind of executive authority that has never, in spite of executive orders and the logic of ideal government, either been wholly acceptable to the Department of State or freely offered to it," he wrote.

It would be easy to structure such a system, he said, but he wondered at the price of centralization:

"Can we split the Department of State into an executive foreign affairs office and the Foreign Service? Does coordinated, centralized programming undermine the decentralized initiative and responsibility of programs like the Peace Corps, AID or cultural exchanges? Does Congress itself lose bargaining power when the Executive Branch gets better organized for foreign affairs, and is Congress willing to encourage this?"